The temptation to deceive others compares to a moral dilemma: it involves a conflict between the temptation to obtain some benefit and the desire to conform to personal and social moral norms or avoid aversive social consequences. Thus, people might feel different levels of emotional and moral conflict depending on the target of the deception. Here we explored, in a morally relevant setting, how social judgements based on two fundamental dimensions of human social cognition -'warmth' and 'competence' -impact on the decision to deceive others. Results revealed independent effects for warmth and competence. Specifically, while people are less inclined to deceive for self-gain those individuals they perceive as warm, they also tend to lie more to highly competent others. Furthermore, the perceived warmth and competence modulated the general tendency to reduce deceptive behaviour when there was a risk of disclosure compared to when the lying was anonymous, highlighting the importance of these judgements in social evaluation processes. Together, our results demonstrate that the emotional costs and personal moral standards that inhibit engagement in deceptive behaviour are not stable but rather malleable according to the target and the consequences of the deception.
Despite the fact that deception is a constant in daily life and may even be necessary for adequate social functioning in many situations, such behaviour is socially condemned (Mastroberardino, & Santangelo, 2009; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009) . Typically, deceptive behaviour, such as lying, is regarded as dishonest and a betrayal of trust. The temptation to deceive others to obtain some kind of benefit involves a social dilemma, invoking a conflict between the temptation to obtain some benefit versus the desire to conform to personal and social moral norms or avoid aversive social consequences (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Mead et al., 2009) . Lying is broadly defined as the voluntary decision to manipulate information in order to create a misbelief in others (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004) . It often entails some psychological cost to the liar, associated with the violation of moral codes (Mazar et al., 2008) and/or the risk of social penalties, such as reputational loss or punishment (Becker, 1968) .
The social and moral aspects of intentional deception have recently been investigated using ecologically realistic experimental paradigms (e.g., Baumgartner, Fischbacher, Feierabend, Lutz, & Fehr, 2009; Gneezy, 2005; Greene & Paxton, 2009; Panasiti, Pavone, Merla, & Aglioti, 2011) . However, little attention has yet been devoted to studying how social context impacts on spontaneous deception. One factor that should potentially influence the decision to engage in deceptive behaviour is the individual characteristics of the target of the deception. It is reasonable to expect that people might feel different levels of psychological or moral conflict when lying to different targets. Past research, based on self-report, shows that people tell more self-serving and fewer altruistic lies to strangers, compared to people whom they care about (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Ennis, Vrij, & Chance, 2008) . A similar pattern has been found in economic games, where people are more likely to deceive a stranger than a friend (Van Swol, Malhotra, & Braun, 2012) . Interestingly, the use of deception during negotiations is decreased by the perceived trustworthiness of the other (Olekalns & Smith, 2009 ) and increased (during social interaction) when the other is considered to be a liar (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006) .
When navigating the complexities of social life, people rely on categorization processes to make inferences about others' personality traits and simplify the typically multifaceted information originating from other people (Tajfel, 1982; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2011) . Tellingly, automatic categorization processes impact numerous domains of social behaviour such as face processing (Cunningham et al., 2004; Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001) , empathic resonance (Azevedo, Macaluso, Viola, Sani, & Algioti, 2014; Azevedo et al., 2013; Cikara & Fiske, 2011) , ingroup/outgroup categorization (Ponsi, Panasiti, Scandola, & Aglioti, 2015) , learning of social fear (Lindstr€ om, Selbing, Molapour, & Olsson, 2015; Navarrete et al., 2012; Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005) and social decision-making (Stanley, Sokol-Hessner, Mahzarin, Banaji, & Phelps, 2011) . The stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) has proved particularly useful in understanding the social structure of intergroup processes and describing how inferences about others' personality traits shape our cognitive, affective, and behavioural tendencies towards them. This model has been validated within US society (where it was first developed) and also in many other countries, including Italy -where the present study took place (Durante et al., 2012) . The SCM posits that stereotypes may be captured by two key universal dimensions of social cognition that shape interpersonal behaviour. The 'warmth' dimension relates to the perception of others according to their perceived intent for good or ill and therefore comprises judgements of others as friendly, warm, trustworthy, and sincere. The 'competence' dimension is related to social status and the other person's perceived ability to pursue his/her intents -comprising traits such as efficacy, intelligence, confidence, and skill. High warmth is associated with high morality and communality, while high competence is associated with power and high status. Although trait inferences along these two dimensions are usually assessed together, warmth judgements are believed to take precedence over competence evaluations (Willis & Todorov, 2006) and to have a greater weight in impression formation. This is likely to be due to the fact that inferring another person's intentions, for ill or for good, is more important than judging the ability of that person to act on those intentions. The asymmetrical weight given to these types of trait inferences also predicts different patterns of behavioural tendencies. While the warmth dimension is associated with active behaviours (such as helping or, conversely, attacking), perceived competence predicts passive behaviours, such as associating or neglecting (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008) . Indeed, experimental research has shown that judgements of morality and trustworthiness predict approach-avoidance behaviours (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997) as well as trust (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; Stanley et al., 2011) and also promote cooperative behaviour in negotiation contexts (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004) .
In this study, we used an ecological paradigm for assessing deception (Panasiti et al., , 2016 in order to explore how social judgements along these two dimensions modulate the decision to lie to others. In this two-person online card game, participants are always entirely free to decide whether to lie or tell the truth. Crucially, however, the decision to lie or tell the truth determines not only the participant's own pay-off but also that of their opponent. Because participants have total control over their own and the opponent's pay-off, their behaviour reflects only their intentional decisions to deceive, for self-gain or altruistic motives, and not any other competition-related strategy. The game is played under two conditions. In one condition, the participant's decision is completely anonymous (thus, the participant is aware that the opponent will never know whether his/her outcome was due to good/bad luck or to the participant's decision to manipulate it). Conversely, in the other disclosed condition, there is a risk that the opponent may become aware of whether the participant lied or not. This paradigm allows us to simulate, in a laboratory setting, three key aspects of deception behaviour that occur in daily life: (1) lying is intentional and instrumental; that is, it reflects a personal decision motivated by the desire either (i) to obtain personal benefits ('self-gain' lie) or (ii) to lie 'altruistically', that is to increase the opponent's pay-off at cost to the participant; (2) it implies a certain degree of moral commitment or conflict; (3) it involves some risk of social confrontation (Becker, 1968; Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008) . Previous research using this paradigm has demonstrated that motivations and the neural and autonomic correlates (Panasiti et al., , 2016 of the act of telling the truth or lying for self-profit are related to levels of commitment to moral standards, to manipulativeness, and also to image management concerns .
Here, in an upgraded version of the original paradigm, participants were told that they were playing against four opponents, each of whose profiles fell into one of the four categories of the SCM (i.e., high warmth-high competence [HW-HC], high warmth-low competence [HW-LC], low warmth-low competence [LW-LC], low warmth-high competence [LW-HC] ). This procedure allowed us to study how trait inferences impact on the tendency to deceive others. In particular, we were able to explore the relative contributions of others' perceived warmth and competence in modulating lie behaviour, in a morally relevant setting. We also investigated whether and how concerns of social judgement, as indexed by different behaviour between the anonymous and disclosed conditions, have a different impact on decision-making according to the opponents' characteristics. Finally, a number of subjective ratings were collected to better understand the psychological processes underlying the decision to lie or to tell the truth.
Because moral traits are of primary importance in social evaluations (Cuddy et al., 2008; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998) and people tend to trust (Delgado et al., 2005; Stanley et al., 2011) , cooperate with (Steinel and De Dreu, 2004) , and identify themselves with (Farmer, McKay, & Tsakiris, 2014) trustworthy others, we expected less lying for self-gain (i.e., egoistic lies) during interactions with opponents judged as highly warm. Conversely, competence is not directly associated with others' intentions but instead with their power and status. Thus, predictions about the influence of competence on spontaneous deception are not as obvious as for the warmth dimension. While research on cooperation suggests that people are less likely to cooperate with low competent others (e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994) , feelings of social responsibility towards powerless individuals (e.g., Handgraaf, van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008 ) may lead to less egoistic lies when dealing with low-competent opponents. As for altruistic lies, these could be seen as acts of generosity; therefore, we also predicted different modulation patterns for perceived warmth and competence. Warmth is typically associated with active behavioural patterns, such as helping behaviour, whereas competence is linked to passive behavioural tendencies, such as passive facilitation and neglect (Cuddy et al., 2008) . In view of this, we predicted increased altruistic lying to high-warmth individuals but no modulation of lying as a function of competence. Finally, following past research (Panasiti et al., , 2016 , we expected that reputation concerns would lead to higher numbers of self-gain lies in the anonymous versus the disclosure condition. However, we had no specific hypothesis about how reputation may interact with perceived warmth and competence.
Methods

Participants
Sample size was determined using a power analysis based on previous studies from our laboratory investigating the effects of the game outcome and reputation on deception . The effect size (partial eta square) of the interaction of interest ranged between 0.14 and 0.36 with an average of 0.25. We determined that a sample size of 36 participants would achieve 95% power to detect such effect size with an alpha of .05. A total of 36 healthy volunteers (19 males; mean age = 23.7, SD = 2.8) took part in the experiment. Careful recruitment procedures guaranteed that participants were na€ ıve to research involving online interaction with other participants. Nevertheless, four participants were excluded from the analysis for reported suspicion about the procedure. Thus, the final data set comprises 32 participants (17 males; mean age = 23.8; SD = 2.9). This sample size is similar to several other social decision-making studies (e.g., Halali, Bereby-Meyer, & Meiran, 2013; Lenggenhager, Azevedo, Mancini, & Aglioti, 2013; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010; Panasiti et al., 2011; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008) . Participants gave written informed consent, and the study was approved by the local ethics committee.
The temptation to lie card game
The experimental task consisted of a two-players card game where the ace of hearts wins and the ace of spades loses. The participant (P) and the opponent (OP) had different roles. On each trial, the OP's task was to guess which one of two concealed cards was the ace of hearts, that is the card that gave him a win and the P a loss. However, OP was not able to see the true outcome of his choice; that is, he could not know whether the card he had chosen was the ace of hearts or the ace of spades. It was P's task to communicate the outcome to OP. We refer to trials in which OP's choice should have caused P to win as 'Favourable' and to those in which OP's choice should cause P to lose as 'Unfavourable'. Crucially, however, P had the opportunity to reverse the true outcome. That is, by lying P could chose to win when s/he had actually lost (a self-gain lie) or could lose when s/he had actually won (an altruistic lie). Participants were assured beforehand that they were always completely free to decide on each trial whether to lie or tell the truth.
The game was performed in two conditions. In the 'No-Reputation' risk condition (NoRep), P's decision to lie or tell the truth remained completely anonymous; that is, OP could only be aware of what was communicated to him by P. In the 'Reputation Risk' condition (Rep), however, participants were told that on two-thirds of the trials, randomly chosen by the computer and unknown to P, the OP would be able see both the true outcome and what P had communicated to him. Thus, OP would be able to know whether P had lied or told the truth.
Importantly, the game was played for real money so that a win by one player involved a corresponding loss to the other. Participants were guaranteed a minimum of 15 euros for taking part in the study, but wins could increase this sum. To prevent participants from keeping track of their wins and losses, or from doing any other computation on wins/ losses, they were told that each trial would be associated with an arbitrary and variable amount of reward and that this amount would be always unknown to both players. No maximum pay-off was ever mentioned. Finally, they were told that they would meet their opponents at the very end of the experiment. This design allows simulation of the intentional, social, and moral dimensions of lying behaviour in real life.
Experimental procedures
Participants were comfortably seated in front of a computer monitor where stimuli were presented. The experimenter had no visual access to the screen or keyboard and had no way of knowing P's decisions. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 2,000 ms. Then, two covered cards were shown on the screen until the OP had (allegedly) chosen one of them (between 1,500 and 2,000 ms). Immediately after this choice was made, the ace of spades and ace of hearts appeared uncovered on the screen. One of the cards would be bigger, reflecting which card OP had chosen. At this point, P was required to communicate the outcome of OP's choice to him, by pressing the left/ right cursor key to indicate that the chosen card was the one on the left-/right-hand side of the screen, respectively. Thus, whenever P chose to tell the truth, s/he pressed the key corresponding to side of the screen where the bigger card was presented. Conversely, when P chose to lie and thus to reverse the true outcome, s/he pressed the key corresponding to the side of the screen where the smaller card was shown. P was instructed to press the chosen key within the 2,500-ms time window in which the cards remained visible on the screen (see Figure 1) . The left/right positions of the ace of hearts/ spades and the bigger/smaller card were counterbalanced and randomized.
To study how social judgements modulate deception, participants played against four different supposed OPs. They were told that they were playing online with participants who were sitting in different rooms of the same building. Stimuli presentation was organized in mini-blocks of opponent type, so that participants played 20 consecutive trials against a given OP. There were 12 experimental blocks in total, three for each OP, and an equal number of trials (15) for each condition (i.e., Rep/No-Rep and Favourable/ Unfavourable), resulting in a total of 240 trials. Immediately before and after each block, participants were given forced-choice memory questions about the opponent they had played with in that block. Block order was randomized to prevent any systematic order effect. Given that the total number of players was uneven (one P and four OPs, i.e., 5) and that they could not possibly play all simultaneously, two 2-min waiting periods were included between blocks to simulate the times when the remaining participants were supposedly playing with each other. Within blocks, Reputation (Rep trials; No-Rep trials) and Outcome (Favourable trials; Unfavourable trials) conditions were presented in a fully randomized fashion. On each trial, the supposed OPs name was visible at the top of the screen, together with an open or closed eye symbol which indicated the Rep or No-Rep condition, respectively (see Figure 1 ).
Profiles
The profiles of the four OPs were created to fall at the extremes of the SCM's competence and warmth dimensions, while remaining credible descriptions of potential research volunteers. The (presumably) main stereotyping characteristic of each OP profile was based on the social groups identified by the SCM literature (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006 ) and adapted to be relevant to the participants' population, which was university students and young professionals. Thus, LC-LW was described as a low-class Eastern Europe migrant; LC-HW was physically disabled; LW-HC was said to be an ambitious business student; and HW-HC was a friendly music student. Additional personal information was included, to reinforce the likelihood of participants correctly evaluating OPs along the competence and warmth dimensions. An online pilot study was undertaken to validate these opponent profiles (n = 37; 11 males; mean age = 27.9, SD = 4.8). In this pilot, each profile was rated (0-10) on competence, that is how competent (e.g., intelligent, capable, efficacious), and warmth, that is how warm (e.g., affectionate, friendly, trustworthy). Results confirmed that the four opponent profiles differed significantly from each other, F-Greenhouse-Geisser (2.14, 77.03) = 100.68, p < .001, along the competence and warmth dimensions, as intended (ps < .05). It is worth noting that the HW-LC profile was judged as more competent than the LW-LC (p < .001), although both were deemed less competent than the HW-HC and LW-HC (ps < .001) (see Figure 2) . Newman-Keuls correction was applied to all post hoc comparisons. The complete opponent profiles can be found in the Supporting Information. Cover story An elaborate procedure was adopted to conceal the real purpose of the study. Participants were told that several experiments on different psychological phenomena were being carried out simultaneously for reasons of resource and time limitation. They were told that all these experiments had the card game in common and the fact that each participant had completed a profile with their personal information. They were also told that, because each study had different requirements, participants in each study would be assigned to different roles. Participants were told that in this particular experiment, we were interested in studying how memory for personal and non-personal information was influenced by social interactions. After receiving the instructions about the card game, participants were required to answer some personal questions on an online platform, that would constitute their own profile which would be shown to the opponents. Shortly after this, they were informed that all the opponents' profiles had been completed and were finally available for the encoding phase. Participants were instructed to memorize as much information as possible about their four OPs in 10 min. During the card game, that is, at the beginning and end of each block, multiple choice-type questions were asked about the corresponding OP's profile. Thus, for each question, participants were given an individual profile entry and were asked to identify which answer corresponded to their OP for that particular block. Immediately after the conclusion of the task (before the subjective ratings questioning, see below), an extensive memory test was administered. This whole procedure had the sole purpose of strengthening the cover story, and thus, no further consideration will be made in this regard.
To understand whether participants were suspicious about our cover story, a verbal funnel debrief type of procedure was carried out. Thus, once participants had finished all their tasks and had been paid for their participation, the experimenter indicated that it was time to meet the other OPs. However, before the OPs were actually introduced, the experimenter asked the following questions: 'What do you think about this study and the game you just played?', 'Is there anything you want to ask or comment on before you meet the OPs?' and 'Is there any OP in particular who you would or wouldn't like to meet?'. Participants were excluded (n = 4) where they spontaneously mentioned suspicion about the procedure and, in particular, about the existence of other players, for example said 'Were there any other players?' or 'I was wondering if the other players really were in other rooms.'.
Subjective measures
To check how participants perceived each OP, at the end of the card game they completed a questionnaire about each OP. Specifically, they rated (on a scale ranging from 1 to 15) 'How competent (e.g., intelligent, capable, efficacious) do you think he is?' (Competence); 'How warm (e.g., affectionate, friendly, trustworthy) do you think he is?' (Warmth); 'How much do you identify with him?' (Identification); and 'How competitive do you think he his?' (Competitiveness). Participants were also asked to rate themselves along the warmth and competence scale (Self-categorization). To further explore the psychological processes underlying behavioural choices, we also asked participants to rate for each OP (on a scale ranging from one 1 to 15): 'How guilty do you feel about lying to him when he was not able to know your decision?' (Guilt NoRep); 'How guilty do you feel about lying to him when he was able to know your decision?' (Guilt Rep); 'How apprehensive do you feel about meeting him?' (Apprehension).
Data analyses
Data analysis was performed with R, a free software programming language and software environment for statistical computing (R Core Team, 2013). We performed a multilevel mixed log-linear regression analysis with a logit link, a statistical method belonging to the family of linear mixed models (LMM or 'mixed effects models'; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000; Garson, 2013) , through the package lme4 ver. 0.999999-2 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) (please see Supporting Information for standard analyses of variance, Table S1 ). We treated each decision of each participant as a separate observation, obtaining 240 observations per participant. We had one dependent variable (Lie/Truth) and four dummy predictors: Gain (0 = other, 1 = self); Reputation Risk (0 = low risk; 1 = high risk); Warmth (0 = low; 1 = high); and Competence (0 = low; 1 = high). This approach allowed us to explore the independent influence of warmth and competence on lying. Moreover, participants were entered as random factors and fixed effects and interactions were also modelled as random slopes over participants (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tilly, 2013) . This allowed us to deal with the issue of the non-independence of our data set, that is the fact that we used multiple responses per subject. Multilevel mixed models are the preferred statistical method when the dependent variable is binary (Jaeger, 2008; Lindstr€ om et al., 2015) and are particularly useful in tackling multicolinearity problems in situations where observations (lie/truth behaviour) within a specific context level (participants) are highly correlated among themselves (across experimental conditions) (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Field, 2013) . In other words, the model accounts for the fact that the probability of observing a lie/truth in a given experimental condition is largely dependent on the general tendency that each participant has to lie. Reported main effects and interactions are based on model comparisons using the loglikelihood ratio statistics asymptotically approximated to a v 2 distribution. This allows the computation of a p-value that reaches statistical significance if the more complex model fits the data better (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000) . Post hoc pairwise comparisons were performed using least squares contrasts (lsc) and the Tukey correction. For each dummy regressor, the low level (i.e., low warmth; low competence; No-Rep risk; other-gain) was the reference category.
Subjective measures
To understand whether participants perceived each OP as we had hypothesized, the subjective ratings of warmth and competence were entered in a 4 OPs (HW-HC; HW-LC; LW-HC; LW-LC) 9 2 dimension (Warmth; Competence) ANOVA.
1 The Newman-Keuls correction was applied to post hoc comparisons. For the remaining subjective reports, dummy predictors were created for the variables Warmth (0 = low; 1 = high) and Competence (0 = low; 1 = high) and data were entered in different 2 Warmth (High Warm; Low Warm) 9 2 Competence (High Competent; Low Competent) ANOVAs, each having reported values of Apprehension, Identification or Competitiveness as outcome variables. In the model that explored reported guilt feelings, an additional dummy variable, namely Reputation (0 = low risk; 1 = high risk), was used to reflect feelings of guilt under the anonymous or disclosed conditions.
Results
Behavioural results
The average numbers of lies to each OP per condition, are depicted in Figure 3 . The model that guaranteed the best interpolation with our data (see Tables S2 and S3 ) was the following:
The expression within parenthesis indicates the random effects defined in the modelthat is, the intercepts over participants and the slope of each main effect and interaction over participants. The expression outside the parentheses refers to the fixed effects. Both asterisks and colons between effects are used to indicate interactions. However, while asterisks are used to specify that the main effects and lower order interactions within that interaction are also included, colons are used to indicate that only that interaction is considered.
Results revealed that participants tended to lie more to obtain a gain than to cause the opponent to win (v 2 = 4.39, p < .04). They were also more tempted to lie to low-rather than high-warmth OPs (v 2 = 3.96, p < .05). These main effects were qualified by the interactions Gain*Warmth interaction (v 2 = 4.80, p < .03) and Gain*Competence (v2 = 4.62, p < .03). Post hoc analyses revealed that participants tended to tell more self-gain lies (b = 2.14, SE = 0.51, z.ratio = 3.13, p < .008) to low-than high-warmth OPs ( Figure 4A ) and more self-gain lies to high than low-competent OPs (b = .58, SE = 0.12, z.ratio = À2.59, p = .04) ( Figure 4B ). Results also revealed that participants were more likely to lie during the No-Rep condition compared to the Rep condition (v 2 = 377.06, p < .001). The interaction Reputation*Gain was significant (v 2 = 242.15, p < .001) and explained by the fact that when reputation was not at risk, participants told more self-gain lies (b = 48.27, SE = 28.87, z.ratio = 6.48, p < .001) ( Figure 4C ). Interestingly, we found a significant interaction of Reputation*Warmth*Competence (v 2 = 4.84, p = .03), which was explained by the fact that the effect of reputation on lying was stronger for lowwarmth/low-competence OPs (b = 14.25, SE = 7.58, z.ratio = 4.99, p < .001) (Figure 4D) . The remaining interactions and main effects were not significant (ps > .05) (please refer to Table S1 in Supporting Information for statistics using standard analyses of variance).
Subjective measures
A 4 OPs (HW-HC; HW-LC; LW-HC; LW-LC) 9 2 dimension (Warmth; Competence) ANOVA revealed that OPs were significantly differentiated by their perceived warmth and competence, F(3,78) = 58.71, p < .001. Both main effects of OPs F(3,78) = 10.90, p < .001, and dimension F(1,26) = 7.38, p = .012, were significant. Post hoc analyses revealed that, with the exception of the HW-LC that was rated as more competent than LW-LC (p = .004) and equally competent as the HW-HC and LW-HC (ps > .52), 2 all OPs were perceived as expected (ps < .05) (see Figure 2) .
A 2 (Rep; No-Rep) 9 2 (High Warm; Low Warm) 9 2 (High Competent; Low Competent) ANOVA on guilt ratings revealed a main effect of Warmth, F(1,31) = 7.73, p = .009, indicating that participants felt more guilt for lying to high-warmth opponents; a main effect of Competence, F(1,31) = 4.73, p = .037, indicating that they felt more guilt towards the low competence profiles; and a main effect of Reputation, F(1,31) = 4.56, p = .04, indicating that participants felt more guilty when lying in the Reputation Risk Condition (Figure 5 ). No significant interaction was found. Ratings on Identification and Competitiveness and Apprehensiveness were entered into three separate 2 (High Warm; Low Warm) 9 2 (High Competent; Low Competent) ANOVAs ( Figure 5 ). For Identification, we observed a significant main effect of Warmth, F(1,31) = 9.82, p = .003. Neither the main effect of Competence, F(1,31) = 3.82, p = .06, nor the interaction, F(1,31) = 0.11, p = .73, were significant. These results suggest that Ps identified themselves more with warm OPs, regardless of their perceived competence. No main effect or interaction was significant in the Apprehensiveness model (ps > .72).
Discussion
The decision to lie inevitably entails a certain degree of conflict between the temptation to obtain some benefit and the desire to conform to moral norms or avoid aversive social consequences (Mazar et al., 2008; Mead et al., 2009 ). Such conflict is highly dependent on factors such as the context in which the lie is produced and the possible consequences of lying. Here, we used a paradigm of proven ecological validity in reproducing some of the moral and social pressures involved in voluntary deception behaviour (Panasiti et al., , 2016 , in order to study how the decision to deceive someone depends on the perceived characteristics of the target. We show that in the same situational context, that is, playing for monetary reward while having total control over both one's own and the opponent's pay-off, people engage in different patterns of deceptive behaviour, depending on the perceived characteristics of the person they are interacting with. Specifically, we found that people are less likely to produce self-gain lies (which benefit themselves) when interacting with someone perceived as warm (here defined as affectionate, friendly, and trustworthy) than when playing with someone perceived as cold. Conversely, OPs who were perceived as competent (here defined as intelligent, capable, and efficacious) seem to increase the tendency to lie for egoistic purposes, as participants lied more to high-than to low-competent OPs. Notably, however, interactions between these two dimensions were only observed when considering the risk of disclosure, suggesting that in most cases, their independent effects are stronger than any interaction (Lee & Harris, 2014) . In other words, lie behaviour in the different conditions can be better explained by independent evaluations along these two dimensions rather than by specific attitudes towards individual OPs. Finally, contrary to our hypothesis, neither warmth nor competence modulated the tendency to lie for altruistic purposes. Altogether, our results show that the decision to deceive depends not only on the evaluation of the possible benefits and costs that such behaviour brings to oneself but also on the costs and benefits that it carries to others (Gneezy, 2005) . Furthermore, our study suggests that the personal moral standards that help to resist the temptation to deceive others are not stable but are rather malleable according to the context and the target of deception. Previous research has shown that the decision to lie, and its neural and autonomic correlates, in this paradigm is strongly associated with both dispositional factors (e.g., personality traits like levels of manipulativeness or moral disengagement) as well as situational factors, such as the anonymity of the deceptive behaviour (Panasiti et al., , 2016 . Consistent with this finding, we argue that the observed modulation of behaviour according to an OP's characteristics is a reflection of moral evaluations rather than the product of competitive motives.
Even though they are playing for the same resources (i.e., the pay-off), the game's rules clearly imply that no real competition is possible, as Ps always decide who is going to get the reward at the end of each trial. Indeed, because OPs are deprived of the power to decide the outcome, self-gain lies are not likely to be the result of an open competition for the pay-off, nor of explicit defensive behaviour against possible attacks from the OP. Instead, self-gain lies are likely to reflect the triumph of temptation over fairness. Like in other socio-economic decision-making paradigms, such as the Dictator Game (Hilbig, Thielmann, Hepp, Klein, & Zettlerd, 2015; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994) or the Ultimatum Game (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Lenggenhager et al., 2013; Mancini, Betti, Panasiti, Pavone, & Aglioti, 2011) , in which the participant decides how to split the pay-off, behaviour is guided by personal fairness and values of equity. Crucially, however, in our paradigm, violations of fairness imply engagement in deceptive behaviour, that is choosing to provide a false statement. This makes the behaviour in our game different from the other economic games for at least two reasons: (i) because by providing a false statement participants play unfairly but at same time protect their own reputation (the other players will think that they had bad luck); (ii) because attempting to manipulate the beliefs of others (lying) is publicly condemned in our society (Nyberg, 1993) . Importantly, we show here, for the first time in a controlled and morally relevant setting, how social factors, such as others' inferred traits, modulate lying behaviour.
As expected, participants made fewer egoistic lies to high than low-warmth individuals, supporting the idea that moral information is of primary importance in guiding social judgements and interpersonal behaviour (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Delgado et al., 2005; Liuzza, Candidi, Sforza, & Aglioti, 2014; Mancini, Betti, Panasiti, Pavone, & Aglioti, 2014; Panasiti, Puzzo, & Chakrabarti, 2015; Willis & Todorov, 2006; Wojciszke et al., 1998) . These results expand previous evidence that people tend to trust (Delgado et al., 2005) and cooperate (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004 ) more with warm individuals, by showing that inferred warmth reduces the tendency to deceive others. These behavioural tendencies show how social evaluations, and in particular inferred traits of the other's moral worth, impact on one's own codes of action, as well as the relative weight given to dishonest behaviour.
We note that the unidirectional nature of our paradigm ensures that behaviour is not guided by expectations of cooperation. Instead, cooperation-related evaluations may be relevant, to the extent that they are a phylogenetically important factor in shaping social interactions and attitudes towards others. According to several theoretical and evolutionary accounts, pro-social and moral values are at the core of competitioncooperation behaviour (e.g., Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013; Van Lange, 1999) . People with high pro-social values are more likely to cooperate than pro-self individuals as they expect others to cooperate as well, because they have greater feelings of social responsibility and equality concerns (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994) . Along similar lines, indirect reciprocity mechanisms posit that helping others builds up a good reputation, which in turn makes pro-social people more liable to be rewarded by others (DeSteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams, & Dickens, 2010; Trivers, 1971; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) . This explains why helping others or behaving fairly to them pays off, even when the others cannot directly reciprocate. Crucially in the present paradigm, reciprocity computations are unlikely as participants know that the roles will never be reversed and that it is impossible for OPs to reward P's fairness/generosity or punish P's unfair behaviour, either directly or indirectly. Our results thus suggest that such expectations about social conduct are embedded in one's own codes of action and influence behaviour, even in situations where no one can act upon them. Because high-warmth individuals are perceived to be pro-social and low warmth others to be 'pro-self', the psychological cost of behaving dishonestly with trustworthy others is higher than with cold individuals. Moreover, the fact that participants identified themselves more with trustworthy opponents can also help to explain this behavioural pattern. When coming from someone perceived to be similar to oneself (Mussweiler & Ockenfels, 2013) , unfair behaviour is judged to be particularly unfair and increases the willingness to punish. Indeed, our participants reported increased guilt feelings for lying to high warm OPs, confirming that the moral costs associated with deception may be particularly high when interacting with these individuals.
An opposite pattern of results was found for the competence dimension. Participants lied less for egoistic reasons to OPs judged not to be competent, that is less capable and/or with lower social status. Even if in scenarios in which cooperation is possible, people tend to cooperate less with non-competent others (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994) , here participants were less inclined to engage in dishonest behaviour with these individuals. This is consistent with the reported heightened sense of social responsibility when interacting with individuals perceived to be particularly powerless (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Handgraaf et al., 2008) . Because competence does not predict other's intentions nor their moral traits, it is unlikely that this behaviour is explained by trustworthiness evaluations or expectations of the OP's behavioural tendencies; for example, 'What would he do in my place?'. Thus, it seems plausible that social responsibility and possibly feelings of pity may have encouraged participants to refrain from lying for self-gain towards low-competent OPs. The reported increased feelings of guilt for lying to these individuals seem to support such interpretation. Interestingly, however, while competence and warmth dimensions had opposite effects, they did not interact, showing that although they were assessed together, they may have independent effects (Lee & Harris, 2014) .
The present study also confirmed our previous results (Panasiti et al., , 2016 by showing a reduction in lies for self-gain when participants' reputation was at risk. Interestingly, we found that the reputation factor interacted with perceived competence and warmth such that participants told more lies to low-competence/low-warmth OPs when their own behaviour was anonymous, compared to when there was a risk of disclosure. Typically, individuals with this profile (i.e., perceived to be low in both warmth and competence dimensions) are judged particularly negatively and elicit feelings of contempt and disdain. It is therefore not surprising that they were associated with distinct behavioural patterns. The fact that reputational effects were particularly evident when interacting with these OPs suggests a strong dissociation between the personal and social costs of lying to them. Indeed, compared to the other OPs, participants exhibited equivalent behaviour when there was risk of social judgement but they lied more often to them when behaviour was anonymous and where therefore the participant was the only judge of his/her own actions. This suggests that honest/dishonest interactions with these individuals are less related to one's own personal moral standards and more to the desire to conform to social norms and reputation concerns.
Finally, previous research with this paradigm has shown that, even if expectations of direct reciprocity are not possible, participants will also lie to benefit the other person (Panasiti et al., , 2016 . These altruistic lies, although objectively lies, have remarkably different social and moral connotations, as dishonest behaviour is considered more acceptable when benefiting someone else (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2013) . In fact because participants are sacrificing their own pay-off, this behaviour may be seen as an act of generosity. Our prediction was that perceiving others as warm would have encouraged active helping behaviour, such as engaging in other-gain lies. However, warmth and competence did not modulate the tendency to lie altruistically. This indicates that information about the target influences egoistic and altruistic behaviour in different ways. Specifically, other's inferred personality traits modulate the tendency to lie for self-gain but not altruistic lying, suggesting that it is more important for people to be honest than to be altruistic, if the latter implies deception.
Together, our findings show that the decision to engage in deceptive behaviour involves complex evaluations, based on personal, social, and situational factors. Because people need to act according to their own moral standards in order to preserve their positive self-concept as honest individuals (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Mazar et al., 2008) , they evaluate their own behaviour in a malleable way. Even where the objective consequences of the action are identical, the psychological cost associated with lying varies according to the social context and interpersonal factors. All in all, the present study constitutes an important advance in the understanding of the moderators of spontaneous deception, by showing that biases in deceptive behaviour largely reflect internal motivations driven by subjective judgements of others' socio-moral worth. Whereas previous research has shown that levels of one's own moral commitment predict lying behaviour when interacting with a total stranger, we observed here that personal moral standards are malleable and may acquire a greater weight when the target of deception is a high-warmth or low-competence person. Willis, J., & Todorov, A. (2006 
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